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Antiracist Remedial Approaches in
Judge Gregory’s Jurisprudence
Leah M. Litman*
Abstract
This piece uses the idea of antiracism to highlight parallels
between school desegregation cases and cases concerning errors
in the criminal justice system. There remain stark, pervasive
disparities in both school composition and the criminal justice
system. Yet even though judicial remedies are an integral part of
rooting out systemic inequality and the vestiges of
discrimination, courts have been reticent to use the tools at their
disposal to adopt proactive remedial approaches to address these
disparities. This piece uses two examples from Judge Roger
Gregory’s jurisprudence to illustrate how an antiracist approach
to judicial remedies might work.
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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of George Floyd’s murder, there was
considerable public interest in learning more about antiracism.1
Ibram Kendi’s canonical work explains that antiracism is a
commitment both to deconstructing power structures that allow
racism to continue and to affirmatively constructing systems
that facilitate equity and inclusion.2 In Kendi’s telling, it does
not suffice for someone to merely not be racist; instead, Kendi
argued, dismantling systemic inequalities requires people to
take affirmative steps and adopt proactive, antiracist
approaches.3 At the time, people understood that claim as a call
to educate themselves and one another about race and systemic
inequality.4 Pieces on antiracism invited readers to think about
particular policies that might embed or reproduce racial
inequalities, such as redlining, when mortgage loaners decline
loans to Black families in certain housing areas, or other forms
of housing discrimination.5
1. See, e.g., Marlene F. Watson et al., Black Lives Matter: We Are in the
Same Storm but We Are Not in the Same Boat, 59 FAM. PROCESS 1362, 1362
(2020) (focusing on Black Lives Matter as a platform for educating people
about racial inequality, oppression, and Black dehumanization).
2. See IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 9–10 (2019)
(identifying antiracist actions as those that “locate[] the roots of problems in
power and policies” and “confront[] racial inequities”). For a critique of
previous antiracist approaches, see generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
“Gay Rights” for “Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity and Equal Protection, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1358 (2000).
3. KENDI, supra note 2, at 9–10.
4. See, e.g., Anna North, What It Means to Be Anti-Racist, VOX (June 3,
2020,
1:50
PM),
https://perma.cc/V6RU-4GUD
(“To
be
an
anti-racist . . . requires an understanding of history—an understanding that
racial disparities in America have their roots, not in some failing by people of
color but in policies that serve to prop up white supremacy.”); Eric Deggans,
‘Not Racist’ Is Not Enough: Putting in the Work to Be Anti-Racist, NPR (Aug.
25, 2020, 12:03 AM), https://perma.cc/G7QU-48NZ (encouraging readers to
learn about the history of antiracism and to engage with movies and TV shows
that challenge their notions of race and culture).
5. See North, supra note 4 (discussing how redlining led to Black
Americans being “more likely to live in neighborhoods affected by
environmental contamination”); Alvin Chang, Living in a Poor Neighborhood
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There was also renewed focus on the judicial doctrines and
laws governing policing and criminal justice, specifically
qualified immunity.6 Revisiting those doctrines became part of
calls for antiracism.7
With that lens in mind, this piece explores some of the past
and present approaches to judicial remedies for racial
inequities. It draws a parallel between the Supreme Court’s
struggle over how to remedy school segregation (broadly defined
to include schools that are primarily one race) and federal
courts’ struggles over whether to remedy errors in the criminal
justice system that disproportionately fall on Black defendants.
And it invites readers to think about what an antiracist
jurisprudence on remedies would be.
I.

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION REMEDIES

The aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education8 (Brown I)
captures how judicial remedies may be part of an antiracist
jurisprudence. Brown I held that “[s]eparate educational
facilities are inherently unequal” and invalidated school
assignment policies that maintained segregated public schools
by assigning students to schools based on their race.9 Because
school segregation was so prevalent at the time, it was unclear
what Brown I required states and school districts to do in order

Changes Everything About Your Life, VOX (Apr. 4, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/849Y-BWPW (recounting how housing policies created “two
divergent Americas, one with money, and one without—and the one without
is largely black”).
6. See Jacob Knutson, Pew Poll: Americans Support Allowing Citizens to
Sue Officers for Misconduct, AXIOS (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/9U8FB8TN (explaining what qualified immunity is and evaluating poll results on
abolishing it); Ben Embry, Why Now is the Time to End Qualified Immunity,
THE PITCH (July 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/9LU5-PGZF (arguing for an end to
qualified immunity in the wake of George Floyd’s murder by police).
7. See Nicole Cardoza, Abolish Qualified Immunity., ANTI-RACISM DAILY
(July 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/N4W5-GMDY (analyzing how qualified
immunity prevents justice for victims of police violence).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. Id. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”).
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to comply with the decision.10 One possibility was that Brown I
required schools to end school assignment policies that formally
and explicitly assigned students to segregated schools based on
race. A second possibility was that Brown I required states and
schools to undertake affirmative steps to eradicate vestiges of
segregation, and to bring about integrated schools.
The Supreme Court initially sidestepped this question. In
Brown v. Board of Education11 (Brown II), decided the year after
Brown I, the Court said only that “[s]chool authorities have the
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
these problems”12 while courts would “be guided by equitable
principles” in “shaping . . . remedies.”13 Although the Court
emphasized “the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission
to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory
basis,”14 the opinion became better known for the directive that
courts should ensure that schools admit students on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis “with all deliberate speed.”15
While the Supreme Court stayed out of school
desegregation litigation for a few years, except in a few cases
involving massive resistance,16 the Court began to enter the fray
in the 1960s. When it did so, the Court issued opinions that
seemed to adopt the second approach to the Brown II
remedy namely, that schools had to undertake affirmative
steps to eliminate racial segregation in schools, even when they
no longer had policies that explicitly assigned students to
segregated schools on the basis of race.
For example, in Griffin v. County School Board of Prince
Edward County,17 the Court addressed Virginia’s response to
Brown. The Virginia legislature had initially closed all public
schools that were integrated and granted funds to “private”
10. See id. (reserving the question of the proper remedy while noting “the
wide applicability of this decision”).
11. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
12. Id. at 299.
13. Id. at 300.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 301.
16. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (rejecting the Little
Rock School Board’s plan to suspend racial desegregation of schools).
17. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
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schools; after the school closures were invalidated by the
Virginia Supreme Court on state law grounds, Virginia adopted
a “freedom of choice” plan.18 But Prince Edward County’s public
schools remained closed.19 After finding that Prince Edward
County’s school policies were unconstitutional, the Court
emphasized the importance of providing “quick and effective”
relief.20 The Court upheld the district court’s injunction that
prohibited county officials from paying tuition grants or tax
exemptions related to tuition grants for private schools so long
as the public schools remained closed.21 The Court also stated
that the district court could require officials to levy taxes “to
raise funds adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without
racial discrimination a public school system in Prince Edward
County.”22 And in a passage of the opinion that presaged what
was to come, the Court declared that “[t]he time for mere
‘deliberate speed’ has run out, and that phrase can no longer
justify denying these . . . children their constitutional rights.”23
Green v. County School Board of New Kent24 later addressed
a “freedom of choice” plan adopted in the wake of Brown. The
question in the case was whether the plan adequately remedied
school segregation and Brown violations.25 New Kent County,
according to the Court, had a roughly equal number of white and
Black residents, and the schools had roughly equal numbers of
white and Black students.26 In compliance with Virginia law, the
district had initially maintained a segregated school system,

18. Id. at 221–23.
19. Id. at 222–23.
20. See id. at 232–33 (recognizing that an injunction would halt New Kent
County’s practices that “deprive petitioners of the same advantages of a public
school education enjoyed by children in every other part of Virginia”).
21. See id. (“We have no doubt of the power of the court to give this relief
to enforce the discontinuance of the county’s racially discriminatory
practices.”).
22. Id. at 233.
23. Id. at 234.
24. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
25. Id. at 432.
26. See id. (stating that out of 1,300 students in Kent County, 740 were
Black and 550 were white).
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and it continued to do so after Brown.27 The county then adopted
a school assignment policy that automatically reassigned
students to their previous schools and allowed new students to
be assigned by the Board.28 Soon after that assignment was
challenged as unconstitutional, the Board adopted a freedom of
choice plan.29
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, invalidated
the school’s freedom of choice plan. The Court explained that
“Brown II was a call for the dismantling of well-entrenched dual
systems tempered by an awareness that complex and
multifaceted problems would arise which would require time
and flexibility for a successful resolution.”30 The Court
underscored that states and school boards have the “affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary” to bring about
“a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch.”31 And the Court insisted that
school boards must “bend their efforts” to achieve integration
and dismantle segregation.32
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education33
recognized courts’ broad powers to ensure that school boards
were undertaking those efforts and fulfilling their constitutional
obligations.34 The Charlotte-Mecklenberg school district served
a student body that was 71 percent white and 29 percent
Black.35 Yet Black students overwhelmingly attended schools
concentrated in the city of Charlotte, and two-thirds of those
students attended schools that served more than 99 percent
Black students.36 The district court rejected the school board’s
proposed plan for achieving integrated schools and imposed a
27. Id. at 432–33.
28. Id. at 433.
29. Id. at 434.
30. Id. at 437.
31. Id. at 437–38.
32. Id. at 438.
33. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
34. See id. at 15 (“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope
of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”).
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id. at 6–7.
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court-ordered plan that the Supreme Court affirmed.37 The
court-ordered plan included: a “mathematical ratio” that
operated as a presumption for the racial balance that the schools
should reflect (which reflected the population of the district);
“close scrutiny” of single-race schools; redrawn school zones and
school district lines; and bus transportation of students.38
But that aggressive remedial approach, which required
states to undertake efforts to root out vestiges of discrimination
and allowed courts to push them in that direction, lasted a mere
decade. Three later cases, Keyes v. School District No. 1,39
Milliken v. Bradley,40 and Board of Education v. Dowell41
highlight the second alternative approach to judicial remedies
for racial discrimination.
Keyes in particular underscores how courts can take a
different approach to remedies even while they purport to
embrace a broad interpretation of constitutional rights. Keyes
addressed the Denver school system, which had never
“mandated or permitted racial segregation in public
In
Keyes,
the
plaintiffs
“apparently
education.”42
concede[d] . . . that in the case of a school system like Denver’s,
where no statutory dual system has ever existed, plaintiffs must
prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it
was brought about or maintained by intentional state action.”43
Based on the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the
plaintiffs had shown that the state intentionally maintained
segregation in a significant portion of the school system such
that the court could presume other segregated schools in the
system were also the result of intentional segregation.44
37. See id. at 10 (explaining how the district court accepted a plan that
had been modified by a court-appointed expert).
38. Id. at 22–30.
39. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
40. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
41. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
42. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191.
43. Id. at 198.
44. See id. at 206 (“On the question of segregative intent, petitioners
presented evidence tending to show that the Board, through its actions over a
period of years, intentionally created and maintained the segregated character
of the core city schools.”).
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Justice Powell’s separate writing foreshadowed a turning
point in the Court’s remedial jurisprudence. Justice Powell
wrote separately to disagree with the Court’s articulation of the
constitutional right that was at stake in the cases.45 The issue
was not, Justice Powell explained, whether the state
intentionally maintained a system of school segregation or
mandated segregation in public education by law. “[P]resent
constitutional doctrine,” Justice Powell explained, “requir[es]
affirmative state action to desegregate school systems.”46 And
the existence of school segregation, Justice Powell wrote, had a
“familiar root cause”—“segregated residential and migratory
patterns the impact of which . . . was often perpetuated and
rarely ameliorated by action of public school authorities.”47 The
existence of segregated schools was “largely unrelated to
whether a particular State had or did not have segregative
school laws.”48 Justice Powell explained that he “would
not . . . perpetuate the de jure/de facto distinction” and would
instead hold “that where segregated public schools exist within
a school district to a substantial degree, there is a prima facie
case that the duly constituted public authorities . . . are
sufficiently responsible.”49 “Public schools are creatures of the
State, and whether the segregation is state-created or
state-assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant
to constitutional principle.”50
Yet while Justice Powell would have more expansively
defined the constitutional right at issue in the school
desegregation cases, he was considerably more circumspect
about what judicial remedies might be appropriate to enforce
that right. For example, whereas Swann endorsed the use of
busing to achieve integrated schools, Justice Powell warned
about “extensive student transportation solely to achieve
integration” even though he had just emphasized school
45. See id. at 265 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(taking issue with the “long leap” in the majority’s application of constitutional
doctrine).
46. Id. at 221.
47. Id. at 222–23.
48. Id. at 223.
49. Id. at 224.
50. Id. at 227.
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districts’ affirmative obligation to bring about integrated schools
even where segregated schools were not the result of intentional
or formal state segregation.51
Milliken v. Bradley and Board of Education v. Dowell
announced formal limits that clipped the scope of judicial
remedies for school segregation. Milliken v. Bradley involved a
challenge to Detroit-area schools.52 The district court had
imposed a remedy spanning multiple school districts after
finding that one school district had engaged in practices that
were intended to perpetuate racially segregated schools.53 The
district court and court of appeals determined that a
multidistrict remedy was necessary to prevent a metropolitan
area that included primarily Black schools surrounded by
neighboring districts with primarily white schools.54 The
Supreme Court rejected that remedy: “Before the boundaries of
separate and autonomous school districts may be set
aside . . . for remedial purposes . . . it must first be shown that
racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts,
or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of
inter-district segregation.”55
In dissent, Justice White expressed the concern that “[t]he
result is that the State of Michigan, the entity at which the
Fourteenth Amendment is directed, has successfully insulated
itself from its duty to provide effective desegregation remedies
by vesting sufficient power over its public schools in its local
school districts.”56 And Justice Marshall, in a separate dissent,
described the decision as “the Court’s refusal to remedy separate
and unequal education.”57
Dowell cut back further on judicial remedies for segregation
by imposing a time limit on courts’ power to impose remedies for
51. Id. at 242.
52. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1974) (summarizing
the respondents’ allegations concerning public schools in Detroit).
53. See id. at 731–34 (detailing the scope of the district court’s remedy to
the segregation problem it identified).
54. See id. at 732–33 (explaining the district court’s rationale for
approving the multidistrict remedy).
55. Id. at 744–45.
56. Id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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school systems that were segregated by law.58 In that case, the
school board had been subject to a judicially ordered
desegregation plan for five years.59 The school board voluntarily
continued to follow the court-ordered plan for an additional six
to seven years before abandoning it.60 By that time, the Court
reasoned, the “passage of time” made it inappropriate for courts
to order judicially imposed remedies for formal segregation that
had existed a little more than a decade earlier.61
II.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE REMEDIES

With that background in mind, consider a similar
relationship between rights and judicial remedies with respect
to a particular issue in the criminal justice system—erroneous
mandatory minimum sentences.
The criminal justice system is rife with racial
disparitiesdisparities in who is arrested, what happens when
someone is stopped or arrested, and what people are charged
with (if charges are pursued).62 Mandatory minimums, statutes
58. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 238 (1991) (“[T]he board’s
compliance with previous court orders is obviously relevant in deciding
whether to modify or dissolve a desegregation decree, since the passage of time
results in changes in board personnel and enables the court to observe the
board’s good faith in complying with the decree.”).
59. See id. at 241 (explaining that in 1972, the District Court—after
finding previous efforts to eliminate state-imposed segregation
unsuccessful “ordered the Board to adopt the ‘Finger Plan,’” to desegregate
schools).
60. Id.
61. See id. at 249
The test espoused by the Court of Appeals would condemn a school
district, once governed by a board which intentionally
discriminated, to judicial tutelage for the indefinite future. Neither
the principles governing the entry and dissolution of injunctive
decrees, nor the commands of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, require any such Draconian result.
62. See CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & SARAH HOCKENBERRY, JUVENILE COURT
STATISTICS 2010, at 5–27 (2013), https://perma.cc/GG7P-YE64 (PDF)
(documenting the volume of delinquency cases referred to juvenile court and
examining the types of offenses charged and demographic characteristics of
the juveniles involved by age, gender, and race); Criminal Justice Fact Sheet,
NAACP (2021), https://perma.cc/5LG2-MJBT (highlighting racial disparities
in all levels of the criminal justice system); Wendy Sawyer, Visualizing the
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that establish a required minimum sentence for particular
offenders, are no exception.63 There are pronounced racial
disparities in which defendants are charged and sentenced
under statutes containing mandatory minimum sentences.64 In
the federal system, “black men have 1.75 times the odds of
facing such charges, which is equivalent to a 5 percentage point
(or 65 percent) increase in the probability for the average
defendant.”65 And because mandatory minimum sentences are
often harsh, “[t]he initial mandatory minimum charging
decision alone is capable of explaining more than half of the
black-white sentence disparities not otherwise explained by
pre-charge characteristics.”66
One particularly prominent example was the disparity
between sentences for drug offenses involving crack versus
powder cocaine. Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,67
Congress imposed mandatory minimum sentences based on the
Racial Disparities in Mass Incarceration, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (July 27,
2020), https://perma.cc/9GYA-9JFD (“Systemic racism is evident at every
stage of the system, from policing to prosecutorial decisions, pretrial release
processes, sentencing, correctional discipline, and even reentry.”); Radley
Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence That the Criminal Justice System is
Racist. Here’s the Proof, WASH. POST (June 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/34EKDTRP (compiling evidence of racial bias in the criminal justice system);
ELIZABETH HINTON ET AL., AN UNJUST BURDEN: THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF
BLACK AMERICANS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2018),
https://perma.cc/8MJE-7SNX (PDF) (presenting an “overview of the ways in
which America’s history of racism and oppression continues to manifest in the
criminal justice system, and a summary of research demonstrating how the
system perpetuates the disparate treatment of black people”).
63. See FAMM, MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN A NUTSHELL 1 (2012),
https://perma.cc/4PEV-7JZ6 (PDF) (“A mandatory minimum is a sentence,
created by Congress or a state legislature, which the court must give to a
person convicted of a crime, no matter what the unique circumstances of the
offender or the offense are.”).
64. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and
Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker,
123 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2013) (explaining that “a black-white gap” in sentencing
“appears to stem largely from prosecutors’ charging choices, especially
decisions to charge defendants with ‘mandatory minimum’ offenses”).
65. Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal
Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1323 (2014).
66. Id. at 1323.
67. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 841 (2004)).
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amount of drug involved in the offense; Congress used a 100-to-1
disparity in the amounts of crack versus powder cocaine that
triggered the mandatory minimum.68 As a result of the 100-to-1
ratio, Black offenders served almost as much time in prison for
a nonviolent drug offense as white offenders did for violent
offenses, and 85 percent of the thousands of people sentenced for
crack cocaine offenses under the 100-to-1 regime were Black
offenders.69
It was against this backdrop of racial disparities in
mandatory minimum sentences that the issue in United States
v. Surratt70 arose. The question in Surratt is a technical one
about the availability of judicial remedies for mistaken
convictions or sentences.71 An extensive corpus of federal law
governs the availability of federal post-conviction review for
federal prisoners. For persons whose convictions and sentences
have become final (i.e., their direct appeals and possible petition

68. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II) (codifying that anyone in
possession of “5 kilograms or more of a . . . detectable amount
of . . . cocaine . . . shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not
be less than 10 years or more than life and if death or serious bodily injury
results . . . not less than 20 years . . . ”), with § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (codifying that
anyone in possession of “50 grams or more of a mixture or substance described
in clause (ii) which contains cocaine base . . . shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more . . . ”).
69. See DOJ, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 112 (2003),
https://perma.cc/L46C-B8KG (PDF) (highlighting that Black offenders served
an average of 58.7 months for drug offenses, while white offenders served an
average of 74.7 months for violent offenses); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ANALYSIS OF
THE IMPACT OF AMENDMENT TO THE STATUTORY PENALTIES FOR CRACK COCAINE
OFFENSES MADE BY THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF 2010 AND CORRESPONDING
PROPOSED PERMANENT GUIDELINE AMENDMENT IF THE GUIDELINE AMENDMENT
WERE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY 19 (2011), https://perma.cc/M6F5-H3TR (PDF)
(showing that 85 percent of people who would benefit from a proposed
amendment reducing mandatory minimum sentences are Black); Richard
Hartley & J. Mitchell Miller, Crack-ing the Media Myth: Reconsidering
Sentencing Severity for Cocaine Offenders by Drug Type, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV.
67, 71 (2010) (“Eighty-five percent of crack offenders who are subject to
minimums are Black[.]”).
70. 797 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted and dismissed as
moot, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017).
71. See id. at 244–45 (examining whether the defendant was entitled to
post-conviction relief under a § 2255 motion where the sentencing guidelines
recommended a penalty of 19.6 years, yet the court imposed a life sentence).
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for certiorari to the Supreme Court have finished),72 federal law
provides them one year to file a motion under Section 225573
challenging their sentence.74 And for persons who have already
filed one motion under Section 2255, federal law provides that a
“second or successive motion” must be certified by a court of
appeals
to
contain
either
“newly
discovered
evidence . . . sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the
movant guilty of the offense” or “a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme
Court.”75 Neither of those conditions explicitly permit federal
prisoners to file second or successive motions under Section
2255 if they were mistakenly convicted or sentenced on the basis
of an error of statutory interpretation—that is, a court
misinterpreted a statute, rather than mistakenly upholding the
statute as constitutional.76
In a series of decisions after these restrictions were enacted,
courts held that federal defendants could nonetheless challenge
their convictions or sentences under what is known as the
“savings clause” of Section 2255—Section 2255(e). That section
allows a federal prisoner to file an “application for a writ of
habeas corpus” where “the remedy by [Section 2255] motion is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”77
Several courts held that a defendant could proceed under this
section if the defendant was mistakenly convicted based on an
error of statutory interpretation—that is, if the statute, properly
interpreted, did not make the defendant’s conduct a criminal

72. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987) (“But after we
have decided a new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review
requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.”);
Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 39 (2011) (“Finality occurs when direct state
appeals have been exhausted and a petition for writ of certiorari from this
Court has become time barred or has been disposed of.”).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
74. See id. § 2255(f) (stating that a “1-year period of limitation shall apply
to a motion under this section”).
75. Id. § 2255(h).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 2255(e).
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offense.78 Several courts likewise held that defendants could
proceed under that section where a defendant was sentenced
above the correct statutory maximum based on an error of
statutory interpretation—that is, where the statutes, properly
interpreted, capped a defendant’s term of imprisonment below
the sentence the defendant actually received.79 (Over the last
several years, two courts of appeals have adopted a different
approach, and suggested that defendants cannot rely on the
savings clause under these circumstances.80 One of the opinions
was written by then-Judge Gorsuch on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.81)
The question in Surratt was whether a defendant could rely
on the savings clause under a slightly different set of
circumstances—where the defendant was mistakenly subject to
a mandatory minimum sentence on the basis of an error of
statutory interpretation.82 In Surratt, the sentencing court
determined that Mr. Surratt was subject to a mandatory
minimum term of life imprisonment based on his prior

78. See Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that a
defendant can use the habeas corpus statute to challenge the legality of a
sentence based on an error in statutory interpretation under § 2255(e)); In re
Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that under proper
statutory interpretation, the conduct the defendant was incarcerated for was
not criminal); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1997) (observing that
the defendant could pursue a remedy under the federal habeas corpus statute
where a shift in statutory interpretation would have resulted in the conviction
and sentence being unlawful).
79. See, e.g., Webster v. Caraway, 761 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2014),
vacated by order granting reh’g en banc, 769 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 2014); Bryant
v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1274, 1277–79 (11th Cir. 2013); Gilbert v. United
States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011); Reyes-Requena v. United States,
243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001).
80. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d
1076, 1085 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (explaining that after careful review of
the terms and whole text of the statute that “a change in caselaw does not
trigger relief under the savings clause”).
81. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011) (arguing
that the language employed by Congress in writing the savings clause, as well
as the history of the clause, “illustrates that Congress’s purpose in enacting it
surely wasn’t to ensure that a prisoner will win relief on a meritorious
successive motion, or receive multiple bites at the apple”).
82. United States v. Surratt, 215 F. App’x 222, 223 (4th Cir. 2007).
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drug-related convictions.83 But that conclusion was based on an
error of statutory interpretation—Mr. Surratt was not subject
to that mandatory minimum.84 Under the statutes properly
interpreted, Mr. Surratt still could have been sentenced to a
term of life imprisonment since life imprisonment was the
statutory maximum term for Mr. Surratt’s offense.85 But the
district court did not have to sentence Mr. Surratt to life
imprisonment; it could have given him a different sentence.
Instead, it imposed life imprisonment based on the belief that
life imprisonment was the only permissible sentence under the
statute.86
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit initially said that defendants could not rely on the
savings clause under those circumstances—where defendants
were mistakenly sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of
imprisonment that still fell within the correct statutory
maximum for their offense.87 Judge Gregory authored a stinging
dissent.88 I won’t rehash all of the arguments he made about
why defendants can rely on the savings clause when they were
improperly sentenced under a mandatory term of

83. See id. (“[A]t one point in the sentencing hearing the district court
stated its agreement with the Government when the Government erroneously
stated that Surratt’s calculated advisory guideline range notwithstanding the
statutory mandatory minimum, was 360 months to life, rather than 188 to 235
months.”); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (codifying the conspiracy to possesses with
the intent to distribute cocaine and other narcotics as a crime punishable up
to life imprisonment).
84. See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (overturning the Fourth Circuit’s previous decision interpreting the
relevant mandatory minimum).
85. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (stating a term of life imprisonment as
the statutory maximum for a violation of subsection (a) of the statute).
86. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 269 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory,
J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 244 (majority opinion) (explaining that the district court
correctly determined the savings clause did not confer jurisdiction to consider
Surratt’s petition).
88. See id. at 269 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“Raymond Surratt will die in
prison because of a sentence that the government and the district court agree
is undeserved and unjust.”).
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imprisonment.89 But suffice it to say there are many powerful
ones—the Section 2255 remedy was created to streamline
federal post-conviction review;90 errors of statutory
interpretation have long been cognizable in federal
post-conviction proceedings;91 the precedential backdrop to
section 2255 was a regime in which errors of statutory
interpretation could be corrected in second or successive
motions;92 and there are many reasons to think that the savings
clause for federal prisoners preserves the habeas remedy for
precisely those circumstances.93 Section 2255, after all,
authorizes claims challenging the “legality” of a “sentence” in
addition to a conviction.94
While Judge Gregory’s dissent did not carry the day in the
panel decision in Surratt, it did lead the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to grant rehearing en banc in the
89. For a longer examination, see Brandon Hasbrouck, Saving Justice:
Why Sentencing Errors Fall Within the Savings Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e),
108 GEO. L.J. 287, 300–01 (2019); Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and
Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417, 485–89 (2018) (examining various
interpretations of Section 2255(e)); Leah M. Litman, Judge Gorsuch and
Johnson Resentencing (This is Not a Joke), 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 67, 7477
(2017) (critiquing an opinion that denied defendants a remedy under Section
2255(e)).
90. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 213–14, 215, 217, 219
(1952) (recounting Section 2255’s legislative history); id. at 218 (quoting a
House Report stating that Section 2255 was designed to “provide[] an
expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to
habeas corpus”); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 775 (2008) (explaining
that Congress’s “purpose and effect” in enacting Section 2255 “was not to
restrict access to the writ but to make postconviction proceedings more
efficient”).
91. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428 (4th Cir. 2018)
(“[O]ne purpose of traditional habeas relief was to remedy statutory, as well
as constitutional, claims presenting ‘a fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice’ and ‘exceptional circumstances
where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is
present.’” (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974))).
92. See e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963) (explaining
that abuse of the writ doctrine limited a second or successive claim predicated
on a claim that was “deliberately withh[e]ld[]”).
93. See id. at 10–11 (explaining that Section 2255 was “not intended to
change the law as judicially evolved” on abuse of the writ doctrine governing
second or successive petitions).
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), (e).
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case.95 President Barack Obama later commuted Mr. Surratt’s
sentence, which made the case moot and the en banc court never
released an opinion.96 But the order granting rehearing en banc
in Surratt, which vacated the panel opinion, stood.97 And it
allowed the Fourth Circuit to later adopt Judge Gregory’s
approach to the savings clause in United States v. Wheeler.98 In
that case, the court held that defendants could challenge the
erroneous application of a mandatory minimum sentence under
the savings clause.99
There is a parallel between the school desegregation cases
and the criminal sentencing ones. No one can deny the existence
of stark racial disparities in education or in the criminal justice
system,100 even though people may dispute their precise causes.
The cases raise the question of whether courts and other
branches of the government have an obligation to eliminate the
disparities and vestiges of discrimination root and branch.101
CONCLUSION
Federal resentencing is hardly the only area in which it
could be helpful to think about what an antiracist approach to
remedies might look like. Qualified immunity is another; as the
introduction suggested, people invested in antiracism have
already begun to train their focus on that body of law.102

95. United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc)
(mem.).
96. Id. at 219.
97. See id. at 225 (Wynn, J., dissenting from the dismissal) (“Petitioner
moved for rehearing en banc, which we granted, thereby vacating the panel
opinion.”); Surratt v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 554, 554 (2017) (denying
certiorari).
98. See 886 F.3d 415, 433 (4th Cir. 2018) (“We agree with our sister
circuits’ view—and the view of Chief Judge Gregory’s dissent in Surrattthat
a sentencing error need not result in a sentence that exceeds statutory limits
in order to be a fundamental defect.”).
99. See id. at 428 (“[Section] 2255(e) must provide an avenue for prisoners
to test the legality of their sentences. . . .”).
100. See supra notes 26, 36, and 63–65 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
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Here too, Judge Gregory’s jurisprudence provides a
roadmap; it addresses a fact pattern that has, tragically but
unsurprisingly, occurred again.
Henry v. Purnell103 involved a damages suit against a
deputy sheriff who shot an unarmed suspect who was running
away from the sheriff.104 (The sheriff had a warrant for the
suspect’s arrest for failure to pay child support.)105 The sheriff
invoked the defense of qualified immunity, which shields
officers against damages liability except in cases where the
officer violates a clearly established constitutional right.106 The
officer argued that because he intended to discharge his taser,
there was no clearly established violation (given the officer’s
uncertainty about whether he was discharging his gun).107 A
panel of judges on the Fourth Circuit initially agreed that the
officer could be entitled to qualified immunity if mistaking the
gun for the taser was reasonable, over a dissent by Judge
Gregory.108 The en banc court, in an opinion written by Judge
Gregory, reversed that decision and found that the officer was
not entitled to qualified immunity—and that the officer’s use of
deadly force against an unarmed fleeing suspect was a clearly
established constitutional violation.109 As Judge Gregory
explained, what mattered is that the officer’s actions were

103. 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
104. Id. at 527.
105. Id. at 532.
106. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
107. See Henry v. Purnell, 619 F.3d 323, 331 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Deputy
Purnell responds that the short time period in which he had to act and his
unfamiliarity with the gun and taser rendered his mistaken use of the firearm
objectively reasonable.”).
108. Compare id. at 340 (“The lawfulness of Deputy Purnell’s conduct was
thus open to reasonable dispute at the time of the shooting.”) (internal
quotation omitted), with id. at 345 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“Officer Purnell
failed to conform his conduct to the Supreme Court’s specific mandate that
police not use deadly force against suspects who are unarmed and who pose no
threat to the officer or others.”).
109. See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 536 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(“Purnell’s use of deadly force against Henry was objectively unreasonable and
violated clearly established law, namely Tennessee v. Garner’s prohibition
against shooting suspects who pose no significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others.”).
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clearly unlawful; it was irrelevant what the officer thought he
was doing.110
If this fact pattern sounds familiar, it should: those are also
the circumstances of Daunte Wright’s death.111 A police officer
shot and killed Daunte after the officer apparently intended to
use their taser.112
Much remains to be done to address systemic inequality in
our constitutional system. Remedies cannot and should not be
the only fix, since they are primarily backward looking and only
somewhat preventative through deterrence. But as this piece
has suggested, remedies are an integral part of rooting out
systemic inequality and vestiges of discrimination. Judge
Gregory’s jurisprudence shows how.

110. See id. at 535 (“[T]he qualified immunity determination is an
objective one, dependent not on the subjective beliefs of the particular officer
at the scene . . . .” (internal quotation omitted)).
111. See What to Know About the Death of Daunte Wright, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2021), https://perma.cc/CEV3-9854 (describing the arresting officer’s
mistaking of a firearm for a taser).
112. Shawn Hubler & Jeremy White, How Could an Officer Mistake a Gun
for a Taser?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/X2ST-MWUY.

